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Abstract
The role of product market reforms in achieving the objective of higher employment and growth has
recently received much attention amongst academics. The aim of this paper is to analyse some of the
channels through which cross-market effects come about and to assess their policy relevance. The analytic
strategy of this paper relies upon the stochastic real options modelling approach. In a nutshell, our
simulations using numerical methods indicate that comprehensive product market reforms would increase
factor demand and growth significantly in the medium and long run.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C61; D81; D92; J23; L51
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1. Introduction
This paper contributes to the growing literature which aims to link barriers to competition on
product markets and factor demand. The recent decline in economic growth in some European
countries has intensified the debate surrounding the question of the extent to which the inertia of
highly regulated labour and product markets has a negative impact on the creation of jobs and
unemployment. Since the timing of UK and US product market deregulation, which began in the
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late 1970s, fits neatly into the picture of diverging labour market performance dating back to the
1980s, the regulatory product market environment is a smoking gun of sorts for divergent labour
market performances across countries [see, e.g., Blanchard and Tirole (2004) and Nickell et al.
(2005)].
In recent years the OECD has produced an internationally-comparable set of indicators that
measure the degree to which policies promote or inhibit employment and competition in various
areas of the product market.
1 A broad range of policies and institutional arrangements have
influenced these differences. Using a multidimensional clustering approach, Boeri et al. (2000)
have grouped the OECD countries into various clusters of institutional rigidities according to the
degree of labour and product market regulation. They have identified four groups: (a) countries
which combine tight regulation in both labour and product markets (France, Italy, Greece and
Spain); (b) continental European countries with relatively restrictive product market regulation
but with different employment protection legislation (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Finland
and Portugal being more restrictive than Belgium and Denmark); (c) common law countries
characterised by a relatively liberal approach in both labour and product markets (US, UK,
Canada, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand), and (d) Sweden, which together with Japan,
combines relatively restrictive labour market regulation with relatively few product market
restrictions.
2
All this is by way of prologue. A proper discussion of the effects that changing product market
competition brings to the rest of the economy demands that policy oriented debate is placed
within the context of economic theory. Once one moves away from the idea of a simple world
where firms have perfect foresight, additional linkages and further questions suggest themselves.
In particular, in an uncertain environment barriers to competition may affect not only the level of
investment/hiring but also the timing of investment/hiring. Hence we contribute to the literature
by taking the route of a real options modelling framework to shed more light on the regulation —
factor demand nexus.
3
Against this background, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out
the theoretical model. Section 3 focuses on our main research question – posed in the title of the
paper – namely, how much of the labour-abundant versus job-poor growth experiences can
barriers to competition explain? Some concluding remarks are offered in Section 4. Two
appendices at the end of the paper collect some proofs and technical derivations which are rather
involved. Readers who are not interested in the nuts and bolts of the derivations, can skip the
appendices without losing the main argument of the paper.
1 See http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2367297_1_1_1_1,00.html. The indicator on product
market regulation focuses on a subset of government-imposed restrictions. These include state control, barriers to
entrepreneurship, barriers to trade and investment, and economic and administrative regulation. The indicator on
employment protection summarises regulation for regular and temporary contracts. The ‘Doing Business Database’ of the
World Bank also provides alternative measures of business regulations and their enforcement in international comparison.
This dataset covers 145 countries and is benchmarked to January 2004 (see, http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/).
2 A number of insightful empirical studies have analysed the linkages between product market regulations and
employment using these cardinal indicators, including Alesina et al. (2005), Angrist and Kugler (2003), Berger and
Danninger (2005) and Hayri and Dutz (1999), IMF (2005) and Koedijk and Kremers (1996). These studies, however,
suffer from two problems. First, most studies use country data, which “aggregates out” the true dynamics of factor
demand. Second, either employment or investment is investigated instead of modelling them jointly.
3 The analogy arises because factor adjustment costs are at least partially sunk. The consequences of uncertainty for the
optimal conduct of factor demand have been a very active field of research in recent years. Amram and Kulatilaka (1999),
Copeland and Antikarov (2001) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) summarise the principle features of this class of model.
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2. A real options model of (partially) irreversible interrelated factor demand decisions
Recent theoretical analyses of factor demand under uncertainty have highlighted the effects of
irreversibility in generating “real options”. In these models the interaction of time-varying
uncertainty and irreversibility leads to a range of inaction where factor demand is zero as the firm
prefers to “wait and see” rather than undertaking a costly action with uncertain consequences.
Indeed, waiting allows firms to gather new information on the uncertain future. Below we
therefore develop a real options model with two types of inputs (capital and labour) and a rich
specification of adjustment costs. Given the model, we can characterise specific channels through
which the impact of product market regulation unfolds.
2.1. Analytical framework
We now describe the partial equilibrium modelling framework in detail. To keep the analysis




t ;0 b a b1; ð1Þ
where Yt denotes real output, Lt is the total number of employees, Kt is the capital stock, α is the
distribution parameters between Kt and Lt, and a denotes a positive parameter measuring the
productivity of available technology. Kt is subject to changes due to depreciation of capital stocks
and the optimal (dis-)investment decisions by the firm over time. Similarly, Lt is subject to
changes due to quits and/or the optimal employment (hiring and firing) decisions by the firm. We




where p represents the real price, Zt denotes a random variable describing demand shocks, and
ψ≥1 is an elasticity parameter that takes its minimum value of 1 under perfect competition [see,
Abel and Eberly (1994, 1999)].
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Thus, Eq. (2) can also be written as:













t   CðItÞ HðMtÞ xKt   wLt; ð5Þ
where It denotes gross physical (dis-)investment, Mt represents gross changes in employment due
to hiring and firing, and quits from employees, w is the constant real wage, and x represents
4 See Allen et al. (2002) for an illustrative discussion of the usefulness of the isoelastic demand function in managerial
economics.
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constant service expenses.
5 The costs of adjusting Kt and Lt are captured by the functions C(It)




¼ It   dKt; ð6Þ
dLt
dt
¼ Mt   kLt; ð7Þ
where δ is the constant depreciation rate of physical capital and λ is the exogenous quit rate of
employment. It is assumed that the demand factor Z follows a geometric Brownian motion
dZt ¼ gZtdt þ rZtdWt; ð8Þ




(since εt is a normally distributed random variable
with mean zero and a standard deviation of unity), η is the drift term and σ is the variance
parameter. Thus, we have an optimal stopping problem — the firm must determine when it is
optimal to purchase/sell physical capital and/or hire/fire workers, given the stochastic evolution
of Z.
To keep the model simple we abstract from taxes. The representative risk-neutral firm
maximises its discounted flow of profits. The firm's factor demand decisions are the outcome of














t   CðItÞ HðMtÞ xKt   wLt
  
e rsdsjZ0 ¼ Z;K0 ¼ K;L0 ¼ L ;
ð9Þ
where r is the constant real interest rate and Et[·] denotes the mathematical expectation given the
information set available to the firm. The following assumptions of adjustment costs guarantee
that the firm's problem is well-behaved.
6 The total costs of physical investment and employment




t =2 for It N 0
0 for It ¼ 0
p 
KIt þ gI2







L Mt þ lM2
t =2 for Mt N 0
0 for Mt ¼ 0
 p 
L Mt þ lM2





5 The functional form of the profit function (5) is identical to the modelling setup and the profit function used in Abel
and Eberly (1999, p. 344, footnote 6).
6 We therefore depart from the standard assumption that capital (labour) is quasi-fixed while labour (capital) can be
adjusted without cost. The idea to examine employment and investment decisions simultaneously using a real options
modelling framework is not new. The modelling framework can be traced back to Eberly and van Mieghem (1997). The
analysis accomplished by these authors, however, has not addressed the impact of barriers to competition upon factor
demand.
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Eqs. (10) and (11) have some distinguishing features that warrant discussion. With no (dis-)
investment of K and L, the firm can avoid these fixed costs. Purchase (sale) costs are the costs of
buying (selling) or hiring (firing) capital. Let pK
+ (pK
−) be the lump-sum price per unit of
investment good at which the firm can buy (sell) any amount of capital. Similarly, pL
+ (pL
−)b et h e
sunk costs when the firm paying for hiring (firing) a marginal employee. Note that the firm can
sell the redundant physical capital for a positive price. However, if the firm tries to get






7 Adjustment costs of C(I)a n dH(M) are continuous and strictly convex in I and
M so as to satisfy and CII , HMMN0 with the positive parameters of γ and μ. In practice, hiring
costs associated with successfully filling a vacancy will consist of search costs and human
capital investment in the worker. Firing costs consist of all costs that are related to a dismissal,
especially compensation and costs of legal disputes.





























The first five terms on the right-hand sides represent the current profit and the sixth and seventh
terms denote the changes of V due to depreciation and quits in K and L respectively. The last two
terms indicate the impact of demand fluctuations.
2.2. First-order conditions for I and M
The standard result of real options theory is the prediction of optimal decision rules when to
hire (invest) or fire (dis-invest). The rules are usually specified in terms of critical thresholds, or
trigger values, describing the exercise region of the involved options. The width of the corridor
between these trigger values is a measure of the inertia in factor markets. Under the assumptions
sketched out above, the optimal condition for I becomes
p
þ= 
K þ gI ¼ q Z I ¼





























The first-order condition for physical investment shows that the optimal investment strategy is
a two-trigger policy that can be expressed in terms of Tobin's q.I fq exceeds the upper threshold
7 We are not assuming symmetric adjustment costs due to the fact that they are at odds with the data. The rejection is
stronger as the level of data disaggregation rises (e.g. from industry to firm). Using Dutch data, Pfann and Verspagen
(1989), for example, obtain evidence in favour of asymmetric adjustment costs.
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value pK
+ gross physical investment occurs. In turn, if q falls below a lower threshold value pK
−,
negative investment takes place — the firm sells part of its capital stock. In the intermediate
region of inaction pK
−≤q≤pK
+, investment will be zero. The case of total reversible physical
capital investment refers to the condition pK
−=pK
+.
Using the definitions q=VK, qZ=VKZ, qK=VKK and qZZ=VKZZ and differentiating both sides
of Eq. (14) with respect to K, we have









w   x þ









It is straightforward to verify that the optimal condition for M is
Fp
þ= 


























  wL   xK þ VKðI   dKÞ




The first-order condition (Eq. (17)) shows that the optimal strategy is again a two-trigger
policy that can be expressed in terms of the marginal product of labour, v. Differentiating both
sides of Eq. (17) with respect to L, we have
ðr þ kÞv ¼


















Eqs. (13)–(18) are important for understanding the interaction between product market
regulation and factor demand. Product market deregulation increases the competitive pressures
among firms (lowers ψ), which lowers the markup. Thus for given wages w=w ¯ and service
expenses x=x ¯, factor demand increase at the firm level. If the number of firms remains constant,
this leads to higher employment because aggregate labour demand increases.
8
The partial irreversibility of the firm's optimal investment/employment leads to inaction
regions for the decisions of capital and employment in terms of q and v. The next step is to solve
and obtain the thresholds — boundaries of the inaction regions (see the Appendix A for the details
of the derivations of q and v, and the solutions to the optimal stopping problems). The investment
and disinvestment thresholds for capitals are denoted by ZK+ and ZK−, and the hiring and firing
8 If product market deregulation also lowers entry costs, new entry further increases employment. A more competitive
institutional setting will thus contribute to a more innovative and dynamic economy through thriving entrepreneurial
activity and innovation [see, e.g. Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Nickell (1996)].
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thresholds for labour, ZL+ and ZL−. It is then easy to see that the inaction region of physical capital
investment is denoted by ZK−bZbZK+, and the inaction region of employment decisions by ZL−
bZbZL+. Formally, the thresholds have to accomplish the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions.
9 Both conditions ensure that along the boundaries the firm is indifferent at the margin
between an adjustment at date t and waiting dt to make the adjustment at date t+dt.
10 We are now
in a position to calibrate our model and approach our quantitative questions.
3. Numerical simulations
The complexity of the model necessitates numerical simulation because closed-form solutions
cannot be derived. We therefore use numerical simulations to gain further insight into the results
of the previous section, to have a “feel” for the model and to “draw a map” of the factor demand
sensitivity to various structural characteristics of the environment in which firms operate. We
hope to show that the insights gained from simulations are sufficiently rich to indicate that it
provides a useful complement to theory.
First we describe the data and parameter assumptions that will be required to calibrate the
model. The unit time length corresponds to one year and annual rates are used when applicable.
Where possible, parameter values are drawn from empirical studies. Our base parameters which
were chosen for realism are σ=0.1,η=0.0,r=0.05,δ=0.05,λ=0.08,ψ=1.5, α=0.7,w=1.0,
a=14.5, pK
+=12.0, pK
−=6.0 (50% of pK
+), pL
+=0.1, pL
−=0.6 and x=1.2 (10% of pK
+). For
simplicity, we normalise capital and labour such that K=L=2.0.
11 The firing and hiring
9 The systems are, in principles, similar to the works by Bentolila and Bertola (1990) for solving employment decisions
and by Abel and Eberly (1994) and Bertola and Caballero (1994) for solving the capital investment and employment
decisions.
10 The value-matching conditions involve the value function, while the smooth-pasting conditions concern its first-order
derivatives.
11 Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003) and Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) have argued that the Cobb–Douglas production
function doesn't lie in conformity with empirics. We have therefore rewritten the modelling framework with a more
general CES production function to test for the robustness of our results. The augmented model is available in Appendix
B showing that the production function specification isn't germane for the main thrust of the argument in the paper.
Fig. 1. The two-dimensional quadrangle for ψ=1.5 and different values of pK
− and pL
−.
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parameters are consistent with those in Bentolila and Bertola (1990) for Germany. Their
estimated firing costs for Germany are in the range 0.562≤pL
−≤0.750 and their hiring cost
estimate (excluding on-the-job-training) for Germany is 0.066 of the average annual wage. Our
specification (pL
+=0.1) is also broadly consistent with the recruiting and training cost of
two months in Mortenson and Pissarides' (1999) calibration. They suggest that this number is
consistent with survey results reported in Hamermesh (1993). The price elasticity of demand
parameter is set at ψ=1.50asinBovenberg et al. (1998). Ramey and Shapiro (2001) suggest
that pK
−=0.5pK
+ is quite realistic.
12
In practice, measuring product market competition is a complex task. Given that product
market competition cannot be measured directly, we need to use proxies. Following Blanchard
and Giavazzi (2003), we think of the regulatory stance on the product markets as being captured,
admittedly in abstract fashion, by the degree of product market competition, ψ. This conveys the
message in as simple a manner as possible.
Results for various parameters are displayed in Figs. 1–7. The threshold plots contain four
lines plotted in the (K, L) space for values for the firing and hiring thresholds (top and bottom
boundaries) and the buy and sell capital thresholds (left and right boundaries). The four
boundaries partitionthe state space intovarious domains. The (non-empty) interior regionof the
quadrangle is the region of inaction where I=M=0 while outside the quadrangle firing versus
hiring and selling versus buying will take place according to the optimal values of I and M.
Eberly and van Mieghem (1997) have shown that the boundaries of the quadrangle are upward-
sloping in the usual case of supermodularity (the production function F(K,L) has the property
FKLN0a n dFLKN0). Furthermore, they have shown that the boundaries separating different
kinds of employment policies are everywhere flatter than the 45° line, and those for physical
capital are steeper than this line in the supermodularity case. As the marginal revenue products
Fig. 2. The two-dimensional quadrangle for ψ=1.6 and different values of pK
− and pL
−.
12 The calibrated model is not based on detailed time series data in the way econometric models are and does not have
the predictive power of the latter. Note, however, that the goal of this paper is not to derive precise quantitative estimates
of the impact of various labour market regulations, but rather to illustrate the qualitative predictions of the model, and to
see what we can learn from this model. We have performed an extensive series of sensitivity tests with no qualitative
change in results. Interested readers may obtain further simulations from the authors upon request.
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evolve stochastically over time, the model predicts that the firm will undertake sporadic bursts
of investment/hiring or disinvestment/firing. Which factor of production (capital or labour) is
more flexible depends upon whether the investment and disinvestment thresholds are farther
apart horizontally than the hiring and firing thresholds are apart vertically. Next we investigate
various comparative statics of the quadrangle of inaction.
13
First, we consider the employment and investment thresholds for alternative hiring and firing
costs for a given degree of product market competition, ψ. The numerical results are given in
Fig. 1. The left diagram can be labelled the “no labour market reform” scenario; the right diagram
the “labour market reform” scenario.
As expected, the major result of the calibrations is that lower hiring and firing costs (pL
+=0.05
and pL
−=0.3) lead to a smaller inaction area for otherwise identical parameters. Decreasing firing
costs reduce the (upper) firing employment threshold and therefore more workers would become
unemployed in a cyclical downturn because it is easier for firms to fire workers. On the other
hand, the (lower) hiring employment threshold is only marginally affected. In common with other
studies, our results thus indicate that lowering hiring and firing costs by itself has an asymmetric
impact on the employment thresholds, i.e. the policy change encourages firing by more than it
does hiring. Therefore, adjustment costs do not necessarily imply a higher equilibrium rate of
unemployment in this “shock-based” framework and the overall employment impact of lower
firing costs in real options framework may even be negative.
14 Conversely, one has to admit that
heavier adjustment costs lead to microeconomic inflexibility [see, Caballero et al. (2004)]. This
tends to hamper the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction at the core of the growth
engine in market economies.
15
Fig. 2 replicates the same graphs for ψ=1.6, i.e. for a less competitive product market
environment. Different policies are usually aimed at influencing outcomes in themarkets to which
they apply directly. Judging from Figs. 1 and 2, however, it is clear that heavier-handed product
Fig. 3. Labour demand functions for ψ=1.5 versus ψ=1.6.
13 The numerical boundary value problems are solved with the method of Newton–Raphson for nonlinear systems. For
a description of the algorithm used to compute the numerical simulations, see Press et al. (2002).
14 These simulation results are consistent with previous theoretical and mixed empirical evidence on the impact of
labour market regulations. See, e.g., Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Nickell and Layard (1999).
15 There is ample evidence that the shift of resources away from less productive and towards more efficient firms
accounts for much of the growth in total factor productivity. High adjustment costs may disrupt this process of resource
re-allocation [Caballero and Hammour (1996, 1998)].
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Fig. 4. The two-dimensional quadrangle for ψ=1.5 versus ψ=1.6, and endogenous wages w=0.85+0.3(ψ−1).
Fig. 5. The two-dimensional quadrangle for ψ=1.5 versus ψ=1.6 and insider–outsider wage determination w=1−0.2
(0.6−pL
−).
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market regulation leads to significant cross-market interaction effects and reform spillovers.
16
The comparison indicates how different degrees of product market regulation change the
likelihood of future adjustments of capital and labour. A less competitive environment (higher ψ)
discourages the hiring of new workers, but by the same token the firm will retain less workers in a
recession. The overall impact is a noticeable decrease in the width of the no action quadrangle.
The implication is that the degree of regulation can have important ramifications for employment
dynamics. The resulting employment impact of changing ψ is further illustrated in the
corresponding labour demand functions in Fig. 3 for two alternative demand shocks Z (Z=1
versus Z=2). Heavier product market regulation decreases the competitive pressures among
firms, which increases the markup. Thus for given wages w=w ¯ and service expenses x=x ¯, factor
demand decreases at the firm level. Even if the number of firms remains constant, this leads to
lower employment because aggregate labour demand decreases.
17 Similar graphs can be plotted
for capital.
Admittedly, our analysis has been conducted in a highly simplified framework. Since lower
barriers to product market competition may foster wage determination, we now consider
endogenous wages. In the previous analysis we have abstracted from wage effects although it is
well-known that unions are strong in regulated industries and therefore anticompetitive barriers to
competition are likely to influence the outcome of the wage bargaining because firms can bear the
cost of higher wages more easily and still break even.
18 Ceteris paribus this will induce firms to
choose capital–labour ratios higher than in a competitive situation. On the other hand, heightened
Fig. 6. Capital demand for ψ=1.5 versus ψ=1.6 and alternative entry and exit costs.
16 Therefore, accounting for cross-market effects appears to be an important element of good policy design. This leads to
the “all or nothing” warning issued by Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag and Snower (1998). They argue that piecemeal
labour market reforms may have had so little success because they disregarded the complementarities between a broad
range of policies and institutions.
17 The discontinuous four-threshold microeconomic model is likely to result in smooth macroeconomic factor demand
adjustment because of time aggregation and nonsynchronous adjustment by heterogeneous agents. The numerical results
are consistent with the econometric estimates in OECD (2005) suggesting that cutting barriers to product market
competition to “best practice” levels would increase GDP per head by 2.0–3.5% in the EU.
18 There is considerable empirical literature devoted to the study of labour rent-sharing in regulated industries. See Jean
and Nicoletti (2002) for an empirical investigation and Hendricks (1986) for a survey, with particular emphasis on studies
of the effects of deregulation on wages.
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product market competition tends to dissipate rents deriving from market power, thereby curbing
wage premia. In order to throw further light on the issue of wage endogeneity, we assume that
wages are determined according to
w ¼ 0:85 þ 0:3ðw   1Þ: ð19Þ
Broadly speaking, tighter product market regulation (higher ψ) leads to higher wages. The
implications of Eq. (19) are illustrated in Fig. 4.The left panel of Fig. 4 is identical to the left panel
of Fig. 1, while the right panel of Fig. 4 gives the quadrangle (no action area) for ψ=1.6 and
therefore has to be compared with the left panel of Fig. 2. As expected, the calibration results
indicate that the negative factor demand effects of higher barriers to competition are amplified by
the endogenous wage increase. Another implication of Fig. 4 is that deregulation of product
markets, for example moving from ψ=1.6 to ψ=1.5 should become relatively easier from a
political economy perspective as it results in employment gains.
Another relevant feature of the modelling framework is that firing costs create a hold-up
problem [see, e.g. Caballero and Hammour (1998)] enabling insiders (incumbent workers) to bid
up wages once they are employed.
19 In other words, firing costs make it difficult for firms to fire
workers, so firms hesitate to hire them in the first place, strengthening the hand of workers who
already have a job. Below we therefore adapt our model to an insider–outsider mechanism where
firing costs increase the bargaining power of incumbent workers [see, e.g., Díaz-Vázquez and
Snower (2003)]. For simplicity and for clarity of exposition we assume that wages are determined
as
w ¼ 1   0:2ð0:6   p 
LÞð 20Þ
in this insider–outsider version of the modelling framework. Alternative barriers to competition
and wage premiums are simulated in the first and second row and the first and second column of
Fig. 5, respectively.
19 In countries with higher firing costs a large share of workers with fixed-term contracts tends to insulate insiders
(permanent workers) from adjustment, thereby increasing their bargaining power.
Fig. 7. Hiring and firing thresholds for ψ=1.5 versus ψ=1.6 and K=2 versus K=2.5.
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The insider–outsider version of the model shows that the four-threshold area is monotonically
decreasing in ψ and pL
−. In other words, insider–outsider considerations provide a channel which
pulls the impact of firing costs via wages towards a negative impact on average employment.
20





and completing any required notification, verification or registration with relevant authorities.
21 Exit
costs measure the time and cost involved in insolvency proceedings (for example, the average time to
complete a procedure, the cost of the bankruptcy proceedings, and the recovery rate, which calculates
how many cents on the dollar claimants recover from an insolvent firm).
22 In Figs. 6 and 7,t h e
implications of alternative entry and exit cost regimes are illustrated graphically.
In a model with capital and labour F(K,L), firms would also adjust labour in order to maintain
an optimal capital–labour ratio. The left and right panel of Fig. 7 shows the hiring and firing
thresholds for K=2 (solid lines) and K=2.5 (dotted lines) for ψ=1.5 versus ψ=1.6. Taking all
the numerical simulations into consideration, we conclude that streamlined regulation indeed
offers win–win opportunities. This confirms the mounting empirical evidence in the literature that
lighter regulation can be an effective way to boost investment and employment.
4. Concluding remarks
There is growing belief that the relatively poorer performance of some European countries – as
compared to the U.S. – in terms of growth and employment during the last decade can be at least
partially explained by the interaction of product and factor markets. This paper is an attempt at
providing a unifying modelling framework that makes explicit and clarifies thinking on the inter-
linkages between regulation, investment and employment.
23 The simulation exercises show that
the intensity of product market competition variable in tandem with hiring and firing costs is an
important driver of employment and growth. An important implication of our model is that
product market deregulation may be very effective in terms of increasing factor demand, i.e. there
20 After the establishment of EMU an interesting development in many western European countries is that the
importance of profit sharing has increased in recent years [see Pendleton et al. (2003)]. This may help firms and will
modify the dynamics of labour demand in expansions versus contractions. A thorough analysis of the profit-sharing topic
in a real options framework is beyond the scope of this paper.
21 The regulation of entry and exit indices aims at capturing the actual difficulty that an entrepreneur faces to start a
business, from a legal perspective as well as in practice. For further information, see Djankov et al. (2002). The “Doing
Business” database of the World Bank (see http://www.doingbusiness.org/Default.aspx) divides the process of starting
and closing a company into distinct procedures, and calculates the costs and time necessary for accomplishing each
procedure under normal circumstances. The OECD product market regulation database (see http://www.olis.oecd.org/
olis/2005doc.nsf/linkto/eco-wkp(2005)6) also includes indicators of administrative barriers to entrepreneurship.
22 The gulf between the Anglo-American world and Europe is striking: According to Djankov et al. (2002) establishing
a firm in the US costs less than 1% of per capita GDP, while establishing a firm in continental Europe costs 18.4% of per
capita GDP. In other words, the continental European entry barriers are an order of magnitude larger.
23 Our model ignores behavioural assumptions regarding market rivalry, which in turn would necessitate some kind of
game-theoretic analysis to take account of the strategic interactions among the firms, the results of which are in turn
heavily dependent on assumptions regarding the information sets available and the type of game being played. The
ramifications of competitive interaction on the decision making of firms have been discussed by Smit and Ankum (1993)
and Leahy (1993). Leahy (1993) has shown that the assumption of myopic firms who ignore the impact of other firms´
actions results in the same critical boundaries that trigger factor demand as a model in which firms correctly anticipate the
strategies of other firms. Grenadier (2002) has recently extended Leahy's (1993) “Principle of Optimality of Myopic
Behaviour” to the apparently more complex case of dynamic oligopoly under uncertainty.
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exist sizable interaction effects and reform spillovers. Another conclusion is that the impact of any
one policy measure with a clever design is greater if it is pushed through in tandem with other
reforms than if it is implemented in isolation.
This is by no means the last word on the causes of Europe's unemployment. But the lessons are
very clear indeed. Streamlining product market regulation is likely to be beneficial for
employment and growth and would therefore support the policy objectives established within the
Lisbon agenda of the EU. The simulation results also indicate that product market reforms help to
make labour market reforms more acceptable for unions.
24
Before ending, we should note one important caveat of our approach. Our objective is limited
to studying the factor demand implications of product-market regulation. It is not our purpose to
evaluate the impact of regulation on social goals that could be beyond the strict sphere of
employment and economic growth. Thus, our conclusions on the impact of regulation should be
evaluated in a more comprehensive context before drawing welfare implications.
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Appendix A. Derivations of the optimal stopping problem for capital and labour
Solving the optimal stopping problem requires a certain amount of finesse. Eq. (13), the first
order condition for capital (dis-)investment decisions, shows that without investment (I=0), the
value of q falls into the inaction area: pK
−≤q≤pK
+. For positive investment (IN0), the value of q
must be greater than the purchasing price of capital, pK
+, and for dis-investment (Ib0), the value of
q must be less than the selling price of capital, pK
−. The partial irreversibility caused by the fact that
the purchasing price is greater than the selling price pK
−bpK
+ guarantees that an inaction region is
created. Thus, we can consider that the investment thresholds begin with the points when q=pK
+
and the dis-investment thresholds starts with points as pK
−=q. Similar arguments apply to Eq. (16)
accordingly. The inaction region for employment changes is denoted by the range of
−pL
−≤v≤pL
+. The hiring region is represented by vNpL
+; the firing region is denoted by vb
−pL
−. We can therefore consider that the thresholds of hiring begin with whenever v=pL
+ and the
points along v=pL








Eqs.(10) and (11) in the text are set to zero).Thenon-homogenousterms in Eqs. (15)and(18) in the
text then disappear accordingly. This implies that Eqs. (15) and (18) can be written as follows:













24 Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have also suggested to cut barriers to product market competition first as product
market deregulation should increase employment. Higher employment would buy goodwill from unions and ease
implementation of additional labour market reforms. Furthermore, structural reform in favour of product market
competition reduces the rents of incumbents, implying a redistribution of real incomes in favour of consumers. This, in
turn, will also increase the acceptability of labour market reforms.
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ðr þ kÞv ¼





















A.1. Derivations of particular and homogenous solutions of q and v
Assume that the particular solution for the shadow price of capitals, q, has the following
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Now only focusing on the homogenous part of Eq. (A1),
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The shadow price of capitals, q, should have the following functional form as the particular
integral components:





   b
; ðA11Þ
where β and A are unknown constants. Then, we have,
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Substituting the above equations into Eq. (A10) yields
r2
2





b   k
1   a
w
  
b þ gb  ð r þ dÞ
  
q ¼ 0: ðA16Þ
Therefore, we have the characteristic equation:
r2
2





b   k
1   a
w
  
b þ gb  ð r þ dÞ¼0: ðA17Þ
The homogeneous (or general) solutions of q then become











   b2
; ðA18Þ
where β1 and β2 are the positive and negative roots respectively of the characteristic Eq. (A16).
The same procedures can be adapted to derive the particular and homogenous solutions of v to Eq.
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; ðA20Þ
233 Y.-F. Chen, M. Funke / European Journal of Political Economy 24 (2008) 218–238Author's personal copy













þ gb  ð r þ kÞ¼0: ðA21Þ
Note that A1, A2 and A3 and A4 of Eqs. (A18) and (A29) are unknown parameters to be
determined by the optimal stopping boundary conditions. The set of boundary conditions that
applies to this optimal stopping problem are composed by the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions. As long as the marginal revenue products lie inside these thresholds, the firm chooses
to wait and do nothing.
A.2. The systems of the optimal stopping problem for capital and labour
As in the text, we define the investment and disinvestment thresholds for capitals by ZK+ and
ZK−, and the hiring and firing thresholds for labour by ZL+ and ZL−. The value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions of capitals follow:
qPðZKþÞþqGðZKþÞ¼pþ
K; ðA22Þ
qPðZK ÞþqGðZK Þ¼p 
K; ðA23Þ
qPVðZKþÞþqGVðZKþÞ¼0; ðA24Þ
qPVðZK ÞþqGVðZK Þ¼0: ðA25Þ
Optimal employment decision-making implies that the hiring/firing thresholds satisfy the value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions
vPðZLþÞþvGðZLþÞ¼pþ
L ; ðA26Þ
vPðZL ÞþvGðZL Þ¼  p 
L ; ðA27Þ
vPVðZKþÞþvGVðZKþÞ¼0; ðA28Þ
vPVðZL ÞþvGVðZL Þ¼0: ðA29Þ
In short, the firm solves the somewhat daunting system of equations given by Eqs. (A22)
(A23) (A24) (A25) (A26) (A27) (A28) (A29) given the initial values of K and L and the betas by
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Eqs. (A17) and (A21) to obtain the threshold for purchasing physical capital, ZK+, the threshold
for selling physical capital, ZK−, the threshold for hiring a marginal worker, ZL+, and the threshold
for firing a marginal employee, ZL−.
Appendix B. The case of a CES production function
Consider the representative firm faces the following CES production function
Y ¼ a½hK
 /
t þð 1   hÞL
 /
t  
 1=/;0 b h b1; ðB1Þ
where −1bϕb∞ is the substitution parameter (ϕ≠0), and all other variables are the same as in
the text.
25 Thus, the corresponding Bellman's equation of the intertemporal profit maximisation






























After optimisation by choosing the levels of gross capitals and changes in employees, the
differential equations of the q and v values for the (dis-)investment/hire (fire) starting points are
respectively denoted by





wZK / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
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ðr þ kÞv ¼




wZL / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
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The particular solutions of Eqs. (B3) and (B4) are not solvable analytically. Due to the terms of
vKK and vLL, differentiation of ½hK u þð 1   hÞL l 
 1
lw 1 leads to no analytical particular
solutions. One of the ways to obtain an analytical solutions of Eqs. (B3) and (B4) for the CES
production is to assume zero deprecation of capitals and no quits of employees, i.e. δ=λ=0.






wZK / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
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25 Chen and Funke (2004) use a CES production function to analyse the effect of working time on the decisions of
firms' hiring and firing by a real options approach.
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Follows the same procedures in the Appendix A and rearranging, we obtain the following





wZK / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
 1
/w 1






qG ¼  A1 ZK / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
 1
/w 1
   b1
þA2 ZK / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
 1
/w 1
   b2
;
ðB8Þ
where β1 and β2 are the positive and negative roots respectively of the characteristic equation
r2
2
bðb   1Þþgb   r ¼ 0: ðB9Þ





wZL / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
 1
/w 1






vG ¼  A3 ZL / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
 1
/w 1
   b3
þA4 ZL / 1½hK / þð 1   hÞL / 
 1
/w 1
   b4
;
ðB11Þ
where β3 and β4 are also the positive and negative roots of Eq. (B9). The physical investment
thresholds satisfy the following value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions as discussed in
the Appendix A, Eqs. (A22) (A23) (A24) (A25) (A26) (A27) (A28) (A29).
The benchmark values for the CES case are identical to the CD case, except δ=λ=0,θ=0.7and
ϕ=0.4825. The substitution elasticity, 1/(1+ϕ), equals 0.7 and has been taken from Pissarides
Fig. B1. The two-dimensional quadrangle for ψ=1.5 and different values of pK
− and pL
− for CES production function with
δ=λ=0.
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(1998) and Chen and Funke (2004). Fig. B1 replicates Fig. 1 in the text for the CES production
function. To compare Fig. B1 with the CD benchmark, Fig. B2 replicates Fig. 1 for δ=λ=0.
Comparing both figures shows that the choosing of the CES production function does not change the
results, qualitatively. Again, the lower hiring and firing costs (pL
+=0.05andpL
−=0.3) lead to a smaller
inaction area for otherwise identical parameters.
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